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INTRODUCTION

This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific
performance for attempted breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It
will be shown that after the supplier receives relevant private information,
renegotiation does not always occur even though gains from trade exist.
Further, this article will argue that enforcement of specific performance can
result in a higher level of expected social welfare, appropriately defined,

relative to the case where monetary damages for breach of contract are
permitted.
Specific performance, as the name implies, is the requirement that the
exact terms of a contract be fulfilled. Specific performance is not the common
remedy for breach of contract. It is generally enforced only when money
damages provide inadequate relief for breach of contract. However, as this
article will attempt to show, the threat of specific performance can provide
desirable incentive features. Thus, specific performance might deserve more
careful attention than it has heretofore been afforded.
As noted, courts generally grant specific performance only when money
damages are inadequate. This situation typically occurs when the buyer has
no substitute for the contracted performance. For example, when the
performance in question involves such commodities as land, heirlooms,
antiques, patents, copyrights, or businesses, the uniqueness of these items
makes it difficult to assess adequate monetary compensation for the buyer
when the supplier refuses to perform. The Uniform Commercial Code § 2716(1) (1987) expands upon the uniqueness standard by stating that
"[s]pecific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances." The "other proper circumstances" are not
defined fully in the official comments; but the comments suggest that the
"inability to cover" by purchasing substitute goods would be strong evidence
in favor of granting specific performance.
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Provisions of this sort have not traditionally been applied in commercial
settings. Since substitute goods or alternative suppliers are usually available,
commercial goods rarely satisfy the "uniqueness" test or the "inability to
cover" test. Thus, specific performance has seldom been granted for breach
of short-term commercial contracts.' Since breach of long-term commercial
contracts raises further difficult issues in assessing money damages, courts
2
have occasionally granted specific performance in these cases.
The argument against the expanded use of specific performance is that its
use might increase undesirable rent-seeking, and also increase negotiation
costs. To illustrate, suppose a new buyer turns out to value the supplier's
goods more highly than the original contracting buyer. The ability to
renegotiate the original contract allows the supplier to avoid specific
performance. This prevents an inefficient use of the goods by the original
buyer, or a costly additional transfer of the goods from the original buyer to
the new buyer. However, the threat of enforcing specific performance could
enable the contracting buyer to extract some of the gain in efficiency that
arises from selling the goods to the new buyer. To avoid such rent-seeking,
the courts should only employ specific performance when it is impossible to

1. Recent decisions have indicated an expansion of the use of specific performance for onetime commercial contracts. Perhaps the most notable cases involved cotton futures contracts during
the mid-1970's. See Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second
Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 129 (1981). Many farmers defaulted on their agreement to
deliver cotton at 30 cents per pound when the market price approached one dollar per pound.
Despite the relatively homogeneous nature of cotton and the existence of well-organized markets for
cotton, most courts required the farmers to deliver the cotton as promised (that is, specific
performance was ordered). Some courts referred to the prevailing scarcity of cotton; others noted
that buyers were committed to resale contracts.
Obligations of the buyer on related contracts were also cited as a reason for granting specific
performance in Ace Equip. Co. v. Aqua Chem., Inc., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 300 (1975). In this case, the
buyer had agreed to resell a used electrical transformer that had been promised to him by a supplier.
The supplier initially failed to deliver the transformer, but the court ordered specific performance.
The court pointed out that the buyer could be liable for speculative and extensive consequential
damages for failure to perform on the resale contract.
2. The official comments to U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1987) do suggest that specific performance is
suitable for requirements contracts. There are a number of instances where specific performance has
been granted in the case of long-term contracts. Some cases involve raw materials whose uniqueness
is derived from their scarcity and important specialized uses. But other cases involve raw materials
that are readily available on spot markets. The most notable case is Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil
Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975). Amoco agreed to supply propane to Laclede, but in the winter of
1972-73 Amoco was unable to fulfill all of its contracts for propane. It announced that previous
requirements would be reduced by 80%. Id. at 36. Laclede sued for breach of contract and asked for
specific performance. The Eighth Circuit granted the request even though propane was readily
available on the spot market, although at higher prices. The court reasoned that it would be difficult
and costly for Laclede to enter into alternative long-term contracts for propane. Indeed, the court
stated that expert testimony indicated Laclede most likely could not find a replacement long-term
contract. It also concluded that money damages would be difficult to calculate for a long-term
contract in light of the uncertainty in the world energy markets. Id. at 40.
Similarly, in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1975), the
court granted specific performance of a long-term contract in which Gulf agreed to supply aviation
fuel to Eastern. See Axelrod, Specific Performance of Contractsfor Sales of Goods: Expansion or Retrenchment
in the 1980s, 7 VT. L. REV. 249, 262-63 (1982); Greenberg, Specific Performance under U.C.C. § 2-716:
"A More LiberalAttitude" in the "Grand Style, " 87 COM. L.J. 583, 597 (1982).
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calculate the monetary damages incurred by the contracting buyer from
3
breach of contract.
The theory often advanced in the legal community for expanded use of
specific performance is that specific performance can fully protect the
subjective value of the contract to the non-breaching party. Schwartz has
argued that money damages typically undercompensate the non-breaching
party. 4 Buyers often find it difficult to recover damages for the incidental
costs incurred in obtaining substitute goods, employing less suitable goods,
and delaying production, for example. Schwartz also disputes the contention
that use of specific performance will lead to excessive rent-seeking.
Therefore, he recommends expanded use of specific performance by the
courts. He also suggests that parties be allowed to contract for specific
performance in the same fashion that they now contract for liquidated
5
damages.
This article will examine renegotiation of an initial contract where specific
performance can be enforced in the event of attempted breach. One purpose
in doing so is to demonstrate the gains that arise when specific performance
can be threatened in the event of attempted breach. A second purpose is to
characterize the nature of the renegotiation that ensues when specific
performance can be enforced.
The contract setting we consider is a one-time transaction involving
commercial goods. The goods need not be "unique" in the legal sense of not
being able to fashion an adequate money damage award. Thus, the initial
contract is not one that would normally meet the requirements for specific
performance in the event of attempted breach. However, there are no legal or
economic reasons for ruling out specific performance in this setting. In
particular, there is little difficulty in specifying and monitoring performance in
the environment we consider. 6 Thus, one could envision more liberal legal
3. Several authors have argued that this is the practical intent of imposing the "uniqueness"
test in the common law and the "inability to cover" test of the U.C.C. They argue further that the
goal of contract law should be to specify the remedy that the parties would have optimally chosen ex
ante. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105-14, 117-19 (1986); Muris, The Costs of Freely
Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1064-68.
4. Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance, 89 YALE I.J. 271, 291-96 (1979). See also Linzer,
supra note 1, at 111, 131-34 (courts should base their choice between money damages and specific
performance remedies on the basis of which best protects the subjective value of the non-breaching
party); Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 362-63 (1978) (courts are more likely to
undercompensate the non-breaching party when damages are difficult to assess. Therefore, these
are the instances where the court should select specific performance.); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 364-66 (1984).
5. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 291-96. Of course, some limitations on the remedies would
remain. For example, explicit penalties would not be permitted in a liquidated damage remedy. In
addition, impossibility would be a defense to the specific performance remedy.
6. For simplicity, it is assumed that the goods are homogeneous and not identified to this
particular contract. In cases where the goods are identified, specific performance might be
enforceable under the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-716(e)(3).
It should also be noted that damages might be difficult to calculate in this setting because the
buyer must investigate the cost of covering with substitute goods. In general, the minimal costs of
cover will not be publicly known. Similarly, the buyer's efforts in searching for substitute goods may
be difficult to verify.
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criteria for the grant of specific performance by the courts. Alternatively, one
might envision the courts routinely enforcing a contract drawn up by two
parties in which specific performance is specified as the only adequate
remedy.
In our model, after a simple initial contract is agreed to by a buyer and
supplier, only the supplier, and not the buyer, learns the price that other firms
are willing to pay for goods in his inventory. This price is also the unit cost at
which the supplier can secure additional supply of the good if needed for
delivery. This price information that the supplier learns could lead to
incentives for renegotiation of the original contract. We examine the nature
of a particular form of negotiation in which the buyer is endowed with all of
7
the bargaining power.
Formally, the model begins at time To when a buyer and supplier meet. At
this time, the supplier's resources are limited. In particular, he cannot post
any monetary bond with the buyer that would ensure future performance.
Nor can he purchase any inventory of the good in question for future delivery
to the buyer unless the buyer finances the purchase. 8 At this initial time, To,
the two parties share the same imperfect knowledge about the price the good
in question will command at the critical future date, TI, when the buyer is to
consume the good. 9 (See Figure 1.) They also share the same perfect
knowledge of the unit price, Ce, at which the good can be purchased
immediately. Ce is also the expected value of the corresponding price for the
good at time T 1.
When the buyer and supplier meet at time To, the buyer finances a
purchase of Q 1 units of the good (or product) at cost ceQI with the stipulation
that they be delivered to her by the supplier at time T, in return for a payment
of P dollars. This is the initial agreement between buyer and supplier. In
essence, the buyer endows the supplier with an inventory of the critical
product, with the stipulation that the entire inventory be delivered to the
buyer at date T, in return for a payment of P1 , unless a different mutually
advantageous arrangement is agreed to during renegotiation at time T1.10
The supplier plays a non-trivial role in this model because he acquires
perfect knowledge of the selling price of the product at time T1. Because she
is removed from the process, the buyer never acquires this information. She
7. We endow the buyer with the ability to propose a "take it or leave it" renegotiation schedule
to the supplier; but under the specific performance remedy we consider, the supplier can always
insist on the terms of the original contract, which he initially found to be in his own interest to sign.
8. This is obviously an extreme assumption. These qualitative conclusions are largely
unaltered if the supplier's resources are limited, but greater than zero. The key requirement is that
the supplier's wealth be less than the maximum potential total net surplus from the contracting
relationship.
9. One might think of the buyer as a producer and the good in question as a critical input in
her production process. TI, then, would represent the date at which the buyer must undertake her
production.
10. For simplicity, we abstract from both a formal production process and any third party who
might lend resources to the supplier in order to finance production. Both possibilities could readily
be included in our model.
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can only rely on the supplier to convey information about the opportunity
value of the inventory with which he has been endowed.
During the renegotiation that occurs at time TI, the buyer can propose
alternative delivery-payment I Q, P ]combinations from which the supplier
can select; or the supplier can abide by the terms of the initial contract (Qj,
PI).
The following conclusions arise from this simple model:
(1) For a range of intermediate realizations of opportunity cost, c,
no renegotiation of the initial contract will occur. The supplier will
deliver Q, units of output in return for the compensation, P1, that
was originally agreed upon.
(2) For the smaller realizations of c, more of the product (Q > Q1)
will be delivered. However, the quantity delivered will be less than
the efficient quantity, Q*(c), which maximizes the combined welfare
of the buyer and supplier.
(3) For the higher realizations of c, renegotiation will result in less
output (Q < Q,) being delivered; but the quantity delivered will
exceed the efficient amount Q*(c).
The model also demonstrates that social welfare can be increased when
specific performance is enforced, rather than allowing the supplier to
compensate the buyer for any damages incurred due to breach of the initial
contract.

The analysis proceeds as follows. In Part II, the model is described in
detail, and the problem under consideration is stated formally. Our main
conclusions are stated and explained in Part III. Alternative remedies for
breach of contract are considered in Part IV. Summary comments are offered
in Part V. 1 '
II
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL

The model includes two parties: a buyer and a supplier. The supplier
purchases and delivers a product that the buyer values. The benefit that the
12
buyer derives from the purchase of Q units of the product is B(Q).
The supplier can sell his product to either the buyer or other customers at
date T1. The unit price that these other customers are willing to pay at date T,
is unknown when the buyer and supplier sign a contract at date To for delivery
of the product. At time To, this future price or opportunity cost, c, is a random
variable.1 3 Thus, the buyer and supplier share the same imperfect knowledge
of the ultimate value of the opportunity cost when they sign the initial
contract.
11. Formal proofs of our findings are omitted, but are analogous to those presented in Lewis &
Sappington, Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 69, 82 (1989).
12. To capture the phenomenon of diminishing returns, we assume B'(Q) > 0 and B"(Q) < 0 V
Q > 0, where prime functions denote derivatives.
13. We assumef(c) > 0 V E [ c, c].
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1

TIMING IN THE MODEL
Initial
contract
(Q1,P1)
signed

Buyer
proposes
renegotiation
options

Supplier
learns
c

Supplier
chooses
preferred
(Q,P) option

T,

TO

The initial contract between buyer and supplier specifies the quantity of
the product, Q1, that is to be delivered at date T1, and the corresponding
compensation, P1 . As noted above, it is the buyer who finances the purchase
of the Q, units of the product at total cost ceQ1 14 Such financing is required
because the supplier has no wealth initially. Once the parties sign the contract
for delivery at date To, we assume that either party can enforce specific
performance without cost. Thus, unless the initial contract (Qi, PI) is
renegotiated, the supplier must deliver Q, units of output to the buyer, and
the buyer must pay the supplier P, dollars.
The initial contract between buyer and supplier is exogenous. It might
arise, for example, as the outcome of a bargaining process. Some further
thoughts on the likely origins and characteristics of (Q , P,) are offered in Part
V.15 At this juncture, two comments about the initial contract are warranted.
First, the initial contract is a simple one in that a single delivered quantity and
a single payment are specified. Second, the delivery level, Q1, is assumed to
be bounded in that it is less than the quantity that is efficient for the lowest
cost realization, but greater than the quantity that is efficient for the highest
cost realization. 16
When the parties sign the initial contract, they realize that renegotiation
might occur at the delivery time, TI, when the supplier resolves his initial
uncertainty about his opportunity cost of delivery. At time T,, the supplier
observes the realization of c and thereby learns the unit price at which he can
either sell the Q, units he has acquired to other customers or purchase
additional supplies for his inventory. The buyer never observes the
realization of c. When the value of c is high, the supplier can earn relatively
large profits if he is allowed to sell his inventory to outside buyers, rather than
delivering the Q 1 units he promised to the buyer in the initial contract. When
the value of c is small, however, the supplier cannot secure large profits from
14.

Recall that c e is the expected value of the random variable c:
C

ce

f f (c)dc.
C

15. See infra p. 48.
16. Q1 E (Q*(J),Q*(c)). The reason for this restriction will be made clear in Part III, infra. In
Part V infra, we argue thaf~the buyer will optimally choose Qj E (Q*(),Q*(c))" when she is free to
structure the initial contract as well as subsequent renegotiation. Throughout, we assume that Q*(j)
> 0 and Q*(c) < oo.
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selling his inventory, and may prefer to purchase additional units of the
product and sell them to the buyer.
The model simulates the possibility of renegotiation at time T, as follows:
the buyer proposes alternative delivery payment pairs (QP);the supplier can
either choose one of these pairs, or insist on the original contract (Qi, PI). In
effect, then, the buyer has all of the bargaining power at the renegotiation
stage, since she is the one permitted to make the "take it or leave it" offer to
the supplier.
Despite the asymmetry in the parties' bargaining power at the
renegotiation stage, the buyer's powers are not unlimited in this model. The
initial contract must provide the supplier with an expected profit of at least fr,
even as the parties consider the possibility of renegotiation. For example, fr
might represent some expected profit level that the supplier could secure if he
chose not to contract with the buyer at all. Given the initial contract (Q1, PI),
the concern is with Pareto-efficient 1 7 renegotiation: That is, the buyer
chooses the terms of renegotiation to maximize her expected net benefits' 8
while ensuring that the supplier receives the required expected profit level, '.
Roughly speaking, as the value of if increases, the greater is the presumed
bargaining power of the supplier.' 9
The supplier's profit is derived from two sources: compensation from the
buyer and compensation through sales to other customers. Thus, with
inventory QI, if Q units are ultimately delivered to the buyer in return for total
payment P, the supplier's profit will be P+c[Q,-Q]. As noted above, in this
calculation c represents the unit price other customers will pay for the
product; it also represents the unit price at which the supplier can acquire
additional units of inventory at date T, to sell to the buyer. The supplier will
either buy or sell inventory at time T, to maximize his profits; his decision will
depend upon the realization of c and the terms of the renegotiation offered by
20
the buyer.
The contracting problem can be described in the following manner. The
buyer designs the contract to maximize the expected difference between her
direct benefits B(o) and her payments to the supplier P(-).2 1 The supplier's
goal is to maximize his expected profit. The solution requires that several
17.

Defined in H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMic ANALYSIS 57-58 (1978).

18.
19.

(B(.)-P).
fr is assumed to be strictly less than the expected surplus from efficient production,
i.e., *r <

f[B(Q*(c))-cQ*(c)f(c)dc, where Q*(c)= argmax B(Q)-c

E

Q
.

Q

This assumption simply allows for the possibility that gains from contracting are anticipated by the
buyer.
20. Recall that the supplier is assumed to have no resources of his own. Thus, if he ends up
purchasing additional inventory at time T., he does so (as at time To) with funds provided directly
from the buyer in the payment P('). Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that outright theft
(or misappropriation) of the buyer's funds by the supplier never occurs.
21.
c
Maximize f[B(Q(c))-P(c)] f(c)dc.
QIQ('),P(') c
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conditions be met in order to guarantee that (Q(c), P (c)) is the outcome of the
renegotiation process when c is realized. First, the supplier must prefer this
outcome to the terms of the original contract. 2 2 Second, the buyer must share
the same preference. 23 Third, when c is the supplier's realized opportunity
cost, the terms of renegotiation (Q(c), P(c)) must provide him with greater
profit than any other outcome (Q($),P(e)) proposed by the buyer. 24 Finally,
when entering into the contract with the buyer, the supplier expects to realize
25
at minimum his reservation profit level, fr.

III
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

Because the initial contract instructs the supplier to acquire some
inventory at time T 0 , 2 6 the supplier's cost of performing under the contract
varies with his private information about the opportunity cost. In particular,
when the value of c is small, the supplier's opportunity cost of delivering the
Q, is relatively low. In other words, the supplier realizes greater profit if he
fulfills the terms of the original contract than if he sells the Q, units from his
inventory to outside buyers. Since renegotiation must leave the supplier with
higher profit than he would obtain by fulfilling the initial contract, in an
important sense the supplier is better off when the realization of c is small,
since he can always enforce specific performance if he so chooses.
Consequently, the supplier might prefer that the buyer believe c to be even
smaller than it actually is. This preference will be more pronounced as Q,
increases.
This effect is in direct contrast to the usual incentive of the supplier: to
have the buyer believe the value of c is greater than it actually is. As c
increases, it is more costly for the supplier to deliver output to the buyer.
Therefore, the buyer must pay more for any delivery quantity greater than the
contract quantity, Q 1. The qualitative properties of the solution to [CP] are a
27
direct consequence of these two countervailing effects.
Figure 2 illustrates the solution to [CP].28 For a range of intermediate
realizations of the supplier's opportunity cost, no renegotiation occurs; thus,
22.
23.

>
P(c)+c[Q,-Q(c)]
P,
>

24.

P(c)+C[Q,-Q(C)]

B(Q(c))-P(c) - B(Q,)-P

VCE[Ck].
Vlc E[C,i].

>

' P(o )+C[Qj-Q(o )] VC,eE[Cfi].

25. j

f[P(c)+c[Qj-Q(c)]].f(c)dc 2=ft.
C
26. This is so because Q, > 0.
27. We assume that QIE[Q*(c),Q*(c)] to ensure that both of these effects are reflected in the
solution to [CP].
28. (1) Q(c)=Qi V c[cI ,cj], where c<c1 <c2<3;
(2) QI<Q(c)<Q*(c) CWE(c,c
1 ), where Q*(c)= argmax B(Q)-c'Q;

(3) Q*(c) < Q(c) < Q1 VcE(c.,0);

Q

(4) Q(c)=Q*(c) for c=c,j;
(5) P(c)+c[Q-Q(c)]=P for cE[c,,c 2 ], and P(c)+c[Q-Q(c)]>Pforct[c,,o,].
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the supplier delivers the output specified in the original contract, and receives
the payment to which the parties originally agreed. Renegotiation does occur
for the smaller and larger cost realizations. For low values of c, more output is
delivered to the buyer in return for greater compensation than the parties
agreed to in the original contract. When the supplier can command higher
prices elsewhere for the units in his inventory, he delivers less to the buyer
29
than he originally agreed to, and his compensation is reduced accordingly.
Generally, renegotiation to the efficient delivery level, Q*(c), does not
occur because the actual realization of c is not observed publicly, and
deviations in the delivered quantity help to reduce the rents 30 the supplier can
command from his private information. 3' To see these effects, one can think
of the renegotiation process in the following manner: The buyer commits
herself to a delivery and payment schedule, [ Q(-), P(') 1. Delivery and
payment are indexed by the supplier's report to the buyer of the value of his
opportunity cost. Thus, if the supplier reports that c is his realized unit
opportunity cost, the buyer will pay P(c) dollars for the delivery of exactly
32
Q (c) units of the product.
Recall the two countervailing incentives that limit the set of renegotiation
options available to the supplier during the renegotiation stage. He might
want to exaggerate the reported value of his cost of serving the buyer in hope
of securing more generous compensation for his product. To mitigate this
incentive, the requested delivery quantity falls below the efficient level. The
smaller output reduces the potential gains from exaggerating the true
marginal cost of supply.
29.

Technically, the solution to [CP] has:
F(c)
B'(Q(c))=c + Vc[c,c,],
f(c)
-

and
I -F(c)

B'(Q(c)) = c-

-

cE[C2,j:],

f(c)
where it assumed
d

F(c)

dc

f(c)

d

Ii-F(c)1

and
-

dc L f(c)

<0 Vcg(c,J).

J-

These regularity conditions are common in the literature, see, e.g., Boron & Besanko, Regulation,
Assymetric Information, and Auditing, 15 RAND J. EcON. 447 (1984), and are imposed to ensure that in
equilibrium, the output delivered to the buyer is a strictly decreasing function of c, VcE[c,cl] and

VcE[c,,c].
30.
31.

Rents refer to profits that accrue to the supplier in excess of his reservation profit level, *.
The revelation principle, see Meyerson, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, 46
ECONOMETRICA 61 (1979), ensures there is no loss of generality in representing our problem in this
manner.
32. c E (c,c1 ).
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FIGURE 2
THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT
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The other incentive that may exist for the supplier is to understate
contract
original
order to exaggerate the total profit he would realize if the
in excess of the
output
incentive,
this
were not renegotiated. To mitigate
understate c if
to
attractive
less
it
efficient level is induced. The supplier finds
still receiving
while
he must deliver large quantities of output to the buyer
costs.
compensation consistent with his understatement of supply
incentive is to
dominant
supplier's
The solution to [CP] indicates that the
33
of c.3 4 To
realizations
high
exaggerate low realizations of c, and understate
of the efficient
mitigate these incentives, induced delivery levels fall short
high realizations
levels for low realizations of c and exceed efficient levels for
35 Although these deviations help to limit the gains that the supplier
of c.
eliminated. 6
accrues as a result of renegotiation, the gains are not entirely

34.
35.
36.

cg(o.,c).

See supra note 28, at properties (2) and (3).
Id. at property (5).
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The supplier's profit increases through renegotiation when the value of c is
low since costs of supply are unexpectedly small. The supplier also realizes
increased profit from renegotiation if the value of c is high because the
inventory on hand is particularly valuable.
As mentioned, renegotiation does not occur for intermediate cost
realizations. 3 7 The absence of renegotiation results from the incentive effects
just described and the fact that, in any feasible solution to [CP], the quantity
delivered to the buyer cannot increase with the supplier's realized opportunity
cost. The supplier will deliver a larger quantity only if he is compensated for
delivery at a rate that is at least commensurate with his costs. Consequently, if
the buyer pays an amount sufficient to induce greater output when costs are
high, the supplier will strictly prefer to deliver the larger quantity when costs
are low.
Because induced deliveries cannot rise with the value of c, the buyer
cannot both: (1) induce a delivery quantity below the efficient level for all
smaller cost realizations, as would best mitigate the supplier's incentives to
exaggerate low realizations; and (2) induce a delivery quantity in excess of the
efficient level for all the larger cost realizations, as would best mitigate the
supplier's incentives to understate high realizations. The best she can do
instead is to induce an intermediate region where deliveries do not vary with
costs. Thus, the parties will renegotiate the terms of the original contract for
large and small cost realizations, but not for realizations in the intermediate
38
range.

37. Id. at property (1).
38. A simple numerical example helps to illustrate the magnitude of the qualitative effects
described above. Suppose the supplier's reservation profit level f" is zero, and the random variable
has a uniform distribution over the unit interval (that is,f(c)=1 1 Vc[0,1]). Further suppose the
benefits the buyer derives at time T, from Q units of the product is B (Q) =aQ-bQ' , where a >1 and
b>O are constants.
In this setting, if the buyer could directly observe the unit cost c of the product at T, and make
purchases herself, she would purchase Q *(c) units when c is realized, where
Q*(c)

=-

2
argmax a-Q-bQ -c-Q =

Q

-b

2b
Figure A illustrates this efficient delivery schedule. Also depicted in Figure A is the optimal delivery
schedule, Q(c), that would operate when only the supplier can observe the realization of c. This
solution to the contracting problem [CP] for the present example is given by:

Q*

C
(c)---2b

2a-I
Q(c)=

Q,

-

I
for CE [0,1];
4
13
for CE [4I,4;

4b
Q* (C)+- Q-c for CE
2b

44
3
[-,11.
4
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PROBLEMS

MONETARY DAMAGES

An alternative remedy to specific performance is the payment of monetary
damages. Monetary damages can alter the opportunity set for the supplier, 39
and thereby alter both the gains from renegotiation and the expected

FIGURE

A

a

2b

Q*(c)

2a- 1

4b

/ Q(c)

a-I

2b
i

i

i

It is also straightforward to verify that in this situation, the expected profit of the supplier is 19212b"
The expected gain in net benefits for the buyer compared to what she could secure simply by
purchasing Q units of the product at time To, where

Q=

2
argmax a .Q-b Q -

Q

I
-Q,

2

Thus, two-thirds of the increment in total expected surplus that arises
is readily shown to be 2
from the presence of an informed (although self-interested) supplier in this example is captured by
the buyer, and the remaining one-third accrues to the supplier.
39. The opportunity set is the set of options available to the supplier.
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aggregate welfare that arises under any initial contract. There are two
methods for calculating the monetary damages a supplier must pay if he fails
to deliver the promised output at time T1. First, if there were other goods
available that the buyer could readily substitute for the contracted goods, she
could cover by purchasing these substitutes, and subsequently sue the
supplier for the difference between the cover price and the contracted price.4 0
If r were the unit cover price, then damages would be equal to rQ 1-Pl. One
could model the cover price as arising in much the same random fashion in
which the supplier realizes his opportunity cost. In particular, at time T, the
buyer might obtain a verifiable observation on the price of alternative goods.
If the total cover price exceeds the buyer's required payment,4 1 the buyer's
realized cost of covering exceeds the payments she originally agreed to make.
Second, if cover is not possible, damages could be calculated as the net
benefit the buyer foregoes under the initial contract. 42 These lost benefits are
the consequential losses that the buyer would incur either from discontinuing
production or from producing without the supplier's goods. 4 3 For example,
these losses could simply be the profits the buyer would have received under a
prior contract with a third party-a contract she can only fulfill if the supplier
44
does not breach.
The effect of introducing either damage measure will generally be to
increase the ex post profit the supplier can guarantee himself under the
original contract (Qj, PI) when compared to the profit he could ensure if
specific performance were the only remedy for breach of contract. If cover
were possible, but the cover price exceeds the highest possible opportunity
cost, breach would never occur. The supplier's ex post profit would match
that realized under specific performance for all cost realizations. However, if
cover were possible and the cover price exceeds the highest possible
opportunity cost, the supplier would breach and pay damages for cost
realizations higher than the cover price. Thus, in this region, the profits the
supplier can guarantee himself if the buyer covers are higher than if specific
performance of the initial contract were the remedy for attempted breach.
The second "lost benefits" measure of damages will alter the supplier's
opportunity set in a similar fashion. If the buyer's benefits from the promised
output exceed the maximum possible cost of producing this output, damages
will be so large that the supplier will never breach. However, if the buyer's
benefits are not that large, then for the high cost realizations 4 5 the supplier
40. See U.C.C.§ 2-712 (1962).
41. r'Q>P.
42. B(Q,)-Pi.
43. See U.C.C. § 2-717 (1962).
44. Note that the benefits and losses we speak of here must be verifiable by a court; but we have
assumed throughout that the function B(Q]) is common knowledge.
SVc>c=B(Q.)

--

Q1
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will prefer to breach, to compensate the buyer for her losses, and to sell his
inventory to other customers at the realized price.
Figure 3 illustrates this point. Line segment SS' traces the minimal profit
the supplier is guaranteed by the original contract under specific
performance. The slope of line segment SS' is zero because under specific
performance, the supplier simply turns over to the buyer the units that she
has already purchased. Thus, realized profits are independent of the
realization of c. SSD' indicates the corresponding minimal profit locus when
damages are a remedy option available to the supplier. The kink occurs when
the cover price equals the supplier's opportunity cost, in the case of cover,
and at c=cD in the case of lost benefits. Minimal profits increase with
opportunity cost at a rate equal to the level of the supplier's inventory along
line segment DD'. In this region, all inventory sold is at price c and, absent
renegotiation, none is delivered to the buyer.
These observations are important because the introduction of monetary
damages for breach of contract in lieu of specific performance grants the
supplier additional freedoms, and thereby restricts the possibilities available
to the buyer. Consequently, the introduction of this option (weakly) reduces
the buyer's expected net benefits. Since the analysis can be interpreted as a
problem of social welfare maximization, 4 6 social losses result when the
contract includes the possibility of monetary damages for breach. Hence,
when renegotiation is possible, (weak) Pareto gains are feasible when the
parties exclude damage measures and enforce specific performance in the
event of attempted breach.
This result implies that a routine grant of specific performance would
increase aggregate expected welfare, but reduce the surplus of the supplier.
Of course, suppliers might share in the social gains from specific performance
if specific performance is a contract term over which the parties can negotiate
before signing a contract.
V
CONCLUSION

This article demonstrates that, in the presence of asymmetric information
between the buyer and supplier, enforcement of specific performance may
increase social welfare. As a result of countervailing incentives for the
supplier introduced in the renegotiation process, the supplier's profit gain is
limited to less than that realized when monetary damages are available.
This article also discusses the nature of the renegotiation process. In
particular, for intermediate realizations of the unit value of the good, no
renegotiation occurs. For high values of the good, the supplier delivers fewer
units than the number initially agreed to, but this amount exceeds the efficient
amount that would maximize the combined welfare of the buyer and supplier.
Conversely, for low values of the good, the supplier delivers a higher quantity
46.

Where weights a >

and I -a

are placed on the welfare of the buyer and seller, respectively.
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FIGURE
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than agreed to, but this quantity is less than the efficient amount. When the
simple initial contract is chosen optimally by the buyer, the intermediate
range of value realization in which the parties choose not to renegotiate the
contract can be quite sizable (recall that in note 38 this range constituted 50
percent of the entire range of possible cost realization). Hence, the model
may provide some insight into why contracts are not renegotiated in practice,
even when strict Pareto gains could be achieved if the supplier's private
information were observed publicly.
The analysis to this point has taken the initial contract as given. In fact, it
is possible to show that when the buyer can choose (Q1, PI) as well as the
renegotiation schedule, she will chose a delivery quantity somewhere between
the efficient level of output at the highest and lowest realization of c.4 7 Thus,

the assumption maintained throughout the discussion will be satisfied.
Therefore, the only real restriction of the analysis is the convention that a
47.

QjE(Q*(j),Q*(c)). See Lewis & Sappington, supra note 11.
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single delivery-payment pair (QI, P1 ) constitutes the entire initial contract
between buyer and supplier. 48 Such a restriction might be justified on
grounds of normal practice or because the costs of writing more complicated
contracts are excessive. Of course, such restrictions should be modeled
formally and analyzed carefully.

48. More generally, the initial contract might consist of an entire menu of (QP) pairs. If this
were possible, and if the risk-neutral supplier had more wealth (W) than the maximum possible
expected net benefits to the buyer from operation (that is, if
J

W > f [B (Q* (c)) - cQ* (c) ] f (c)dc -

I]),

the efficient outcome could always be ensured, and the supplier's expected profits could be held to ii.
For details, see Harris & Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information, 20 J. EcoN. THEORY
231 (1979).

